Double Waste Reduction under Standards

Show simple item record 小出, 秀雄 ja 2014-09-02T10:43:47Z 2014-09-02T10:43:47Z 2005-01
dc.identifier.issn 0286-3294
dc.description.abstract This paper proposes a general equilibrium model with “double waste reduction” under standards of waste finally disposed of, and shows that some types of tax and/or subsidy must be required in addition to the standards to internalize externalities due to the waste disposal. Households and firms can reduce their waste independently using inputs or time. Two types of waste are distinguished, one of which is called “potential waste” from the households, and the other is called “actual waste” from the firms. The combinations of tax-and-subsidy policies under standards can be classified by the existence or inexistence of waste reduction by each agent. For all the cases, a degree of marginal disutility due to waste disposal relative to a shadow price of actual waste under the standards is particularly important since it determines whether a tax or a subsidy is required. We also examine a special case where the standards are not binding as a result of zero or very low price of potential waste. en
dc.language.iso eng ja
dc.publisher 西南学院大学学術研究所 ja
dc.title Double Waste Reduction under Standards en
dc.contributor.transcription コイデ, ヒデオ ja-Kana
dc.contributor.alternative Koide, Hideo en
dc.publisher.alternative Seinan Gakuin University Academic Research Institute ja
dc.type.niitype Departmental Bulletin Paper ja
dc.identifier.jtitle 西南学院大学経済学論集 ja
dc.identifier.volume 39 ja
dc.identifier.issue 3 ja
dc.identifier.spage 31 ja
dc.identifier.epage 52 ja
dc.textversion publisher ja
jpcoar.creator.nameIdentifierNRID 1000010320251
jpcoar.creatorAffiliation.nameIdentifierKakenhi 37105
dc.teacher.researchmap-id 1000297356
dc.teacher.researchmap-url seinan_koidehideo

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